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Abstract Managing privacy in the IoT presents a sig-
nificant challenge. We make the case that information
obtained by auditing the flows of data can assist in
demonstrating that the systems handling personal data
satisfy regulatory and user requirements. Thus, com-
ponents handling personal data should be audited to
demonstrate that their actions comply with all such
policies and requirements. A valuable side-effect of this
approach is that such an auditing process will high-
light areas where technical enforcement has been incom-
pletely or incorrectly specified. There is a clear role for
technical assistance in aligning privacy policy enforce-
ment mechanisms with data protection regulations. The
first step necessary in producing technology to accom-
plish this alignment is to gather evidence of data flows.
We describe our work producing, representing and query-
ing audit data and discuss outstanding challenges.
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1 Introduction
The Internet of Things (IoT) is projected to be a multi-
trillion dollar industry with considerable potential to
revolutionise a wide range of sectors, including health,
cities, factories, and energy [41]. Realising the broad
IoT vision entails data sharing, often in a user-centric
and ad hoc manner, across a range of technologies, plat-
forms and providers [27]. At present, we see that IoT
applications tend to operate within silos, as defined by
manufacturers, service providers and/or the associated
technological stack. Realising the broader IoT vision
makes interoperability and establishment of standards
a requirement [36]. Here we focus on societal issues, in
particular, the privacy of personal data generated dur-
ing IoT processes.
IoT devices and their enabling systems are, by their
nature, a constant witness to our everyday lives, be-
ing deployed throughout public and private spaces. We
are already trackable electronically, e.g., through using
credit cards and mobile phones, but there are several
mechanisms for exercising a degree of control. In IoT,
tracking is universal and ubiquitous, which threatens to
mark the dawn of a new era, where every detail of one’s
life is monitored, captured and analysed, potentially in
real-time. The availability of increasingly sophisticated
technology for image processing, learning and inference,
means that people will be identified from the gathered
data and their movements and personal interactions
monitored. Such data is personal and private, and in
most countries subject to law and regulation.
Many aspects of the IoT are consumer driven. For
the IoT to succeed, people and organisations must ac-
cept and be prepared to pay for IoT technology, whether
through their money or their data. They must there-
fore have confidence in the performance of connected
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Fig. 1 Informal IoT devices categorisation by price and computational power.
devices and systems (including security), trust in the
protection of private information, and realistic, trace-
able options for opt-out. Such concerns are not only
consumer driven; data protection and privacy laws in
many parts of the world mandate user consent and con-
trol over personal data. To satisfy these requirements,
it is essential that systems and devices not only per-
form appropriately in a secure manner, but that there is
transparency and accountablity, i.e., that it is possible
to observe system behaviour (transparency) to verify in
a tangible, accessible manner that user and system pref-
erences have been met in accordance with regulatory
requirements (accountability). Moving forward, there
must be transparency in the form of evidence for users
to understand how, when and why their personal data,
or others’ data for which they are responsible, is being
used, and in what contexts. To achieve this, many lev-
els of work are required, including how to specify policy
that embodies or reflects law and regulation, and how
to design user interfaces to ascertain their preferences.
We focus on how data flow and usage may be audited,
so that compliance with law and regulation can be ver-
ified.
Currently, there are few technical mechanisms for
enabling this. Current practice for the use of web ser-
vices is often that the “small print” of the terms and
conditions of use explicitly ask users to effectively agree
to waive their various rights to privacy and data protec-
tion. User metadata and sometimes even content may
be used for commercial purposes, such as through data
analytics – “if the service is free, you are not the cus-
tomer, you are the product”, as the adage goes. For
the cyberphysical world of the IoT, such practices need
to be considered in the light of existing and emerging
regulation, as § 3 discusses.
We consider some of the concerns that regulators
in Europe and the US have already raised about IoT
functionality. We generalise these concerns to a pri-
mary technical challenge: to ensure swift, accountable
realisation of appropriate data flows. These principles
that we seek to enforce derive from both data pro-
tection and privacy requirements, and are designed to
accomodate the wishes and expectations of users, sys-
tem managers, and third parties. Requirements for data
protection will often differ depending on the environ-
ment, e.g., home, workplace, hospital, and a variety of
public spaces. These requirements can be expressed as
policies regarding the flow of data, which must be en-
forced and shown to have been enforced [59]. Here we
focus on means to record information flow from run-
time execution that can be used as an audit trail to
demonstrate compliance with specified policy. Such au-
dit can be represented as data provenance [14], a model
that represents interaction between data items, pro-
cesses and individuals as a directed acyclic graph. Data
provenance can be analysed to investigate suspected se-
curity breaches and monitor compliance with security
policy [9, 10], or to verify run-time properties of a sys-
tem [34].
We explore the challenges of auditing data flows
throughout the IoT. Best practice in future IoT will
require such evidence as a basis for transparency and
accountability. Data-flow audit is not a panacea but
an essential first step. Work is also required on policy
specification and enforcement, interfaces for ascertain-
ing users’ privacy preferences, and interfaces for various
parties to investigate the audit. We address how audit
data can be gathered, how audit in a large-scale sys-
tem such as the IoT might be managed, and how graph
processing tools might assist in querying the audit data.
2 Internet of Things
The IoT, though currently the subject of much hype
and promise, is not a term with a formal definition.
The ITU [1] describes the IoT as: A global infrastructure
for the information society, enabling advanced services
by interconnecting (physical and virtual) things based
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on existing and evolving interoperable information and
communication technologies. From this, we extract an
important concept: the interconnection of physical or
virtual things in an interoperable fashion. IoT appli-
cations have the potential to integrate a large spectrum
of devices, of various resource capabilities (Fig. 1), of-
ten provisioned through cloud services [42]. These as-
pects raise important considerations for any manage-
ment technology. Although there has been significant
work on wireless sensor networks, as well as infrastruc-
ture for supporting ubiquitous systems in general; the
wide-scale interoperability, in line with the broader vi-
sion of the IoT, has yet to be realised [58].
For reasons ranging from customer lock-in, to le-
gal, technical and security concerns, many currently-
deployed (so-called) IoT systems, could be better de-
scribed as silos of things. That is, services tend to be of
a closed nature, where interactions between services are
often limited to a number of known types of things and
a number of known services. These silos can be undesir-
able customer lock-ins due to non-standard technology
and software. More generally, management domains or
application contexts may structure the IoT in a desir-
able way through being subject to a domain/context-
wide authority for policy definition and enforcement.
Examples are a smart home or a public space.
To achieve the broader IoT vision it is necessary
to consider how the flows of data within and outside
such contexts can be negotiated and controlled. To this
end, we have investigated the use of Information Flow
Control [52] for system-wide control of data flows and
made the case that such an approach is relevant for the
IoT [59]. Here, we focus on two things: 1) audit and data
provenance to achieve transparency on where data has
flowed, and 2) the analysis of audit data to demonstrate
regulatory compliance (facilitating accountability).
We consider a future in which technology and stan-
dards exist for the composition and interoperation of
things, thus realising the broader IoT vision from a tech-
nical viewpoint. But for a legally compliant IoT, it is
also necessary to address the fact that much of the data
gathered by IoT becomes personal as soon as people are
identified, and therefore becomes subject to data pro-
tection law [29]. To comply with this, policy must be
defined and enforced on how data flow can and should
be controlled during such interactions, and compliance
must be demonstrated through audit. The vast scale of
the IoT makes audit a major challenge. We show how
the structure of the IoT into application contexts and
management domains can be captured to make audit
feasible.
3 Legal Context
As introduced in § 1, the gathering and interpretation
of personal data from IoT devices raises significant pri-
vacy concerns [29, 64]. These concerns compound the
challenges introduced by cloud computing [62] and big
data analysis [60], and have made the IoT a key prior-
ity for privacy and data protection regulators [37]. The
IoT is also of great interest to competition authorities
and consumer protection and safety bodies, but here we
restrict our analysis to the privacy dimension of law.
Data protection laws, led by Europe and adopted
by many countries around the world, seek to regulate
and control all flows of personal data (in essence, infor-
mation identifiable to individuals) to specific legitimate
purposes, with various safeguards for individuals and
responsibilities on those who hold, manage and operate
on personal data. In other jurisdictions, most notably
the United States, which do not have such omnibus data
protection laws, there are sectoral restrictions on per-
sonal data in areas such as health and finance, as well
as general Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPP),
which include principles such as notice, choice, access,
accuracy, data minimization, security, and accountabil-
ity.
In recent years, regulators on each side of the At-
lantic have paid attention to the IoT as an emerging
phenomenon and challenge to privacy and data pro-
tection. We draw particularly on two reports made by
the leading regulatory authorities in Europe and the
US, grappling with the IoT as a direct subject of in-
terest: 1) an Opinion issued in September 2014 by Eu-
ropean regulators under the umbrella of the Article 29
Data Protection Working Party (WP29); and 2) a Staff
Report in January 2015 (and reiterated in comments
in June 2016 to a Department of Commerce Request
for Comment) by the US Federal Trade Commission
(FTC)1.
Both the WP29 and FTC reports emphasise the
continued applicability of existing laws to the IoT. Of
particular interest for our purposes, they also cohere on
two main points that we extend throughout our analy-
sis. The first is a recognition that changes in the con-
text of personal data flows demand user involvement,
i.e., between different environments, with different par-
ties involved, or towards different ends. Notably, this
does not apply if data is de-identified immediately and
1 https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/
federal-trade-commission-staff-report-november-2013
-workshop-entitled-internet-things-privacy/150127iotrpt.pdf,
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/advocacy
documents/comment-staff-bureau-consumer-protection-
office-policy-planning-national-telecommunications/
160603ntiacomment.pdf
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effectively; though if this course is taken and data is
re-identified, responsibility must follow. Audit of data
flow assists in demonstrating how data is used after its
release. The second point made in both reports is that
user involvement may be difficult in an IoT ecosystem,
given the scale of data flows, the diversity of potential
interactions, and the frequent absence of a consumer
interface, but that this does not diminish the respon-
sibility to provide effective notice and control to users
(“clear, prominent and conspicuous”, according to the
FTC; “clear, comprehensive and user-friendly” accord-
ing to the WP29) on flows of personal data throughout
the IoT.
As an example, the FTC elaborates on the data that
an application should gather from a wearable device as
follows: As an example of how data minimization might
work in practice, suppose a wearable device, such as
a patch, can assess a consumer’s skin condition. The
device does not need to collect precise geolocation in-
formation in order to work; however, the device manu-
facturer believes that such information might be useful
for a future product feature that would enable users
to find treatment options in their area. As part of a
data minimization exercise, the company should con-
sider whether it should wait to collect geolocation data
until after it begins to offer the new product feature, at
which time it could disclose the new collection and seek
consent. The company should also consider whether it
could offer the same feature while collecting less infor-
mation, such as by collecting zip code rather than pre-
cise geolocation. If the company does decide it needs
the precise geolocation information, it should provide a
prominent disclosure about its collection and use of this
information, and obtain consumers’ affirmative express
consent. Finally, it should establish reasonable reten-
tion limits for the data that it does collect.
The context surrounding data is also an important
consideration. Context has been considered pre-IoT re-
garding access to Electronic Health Records (EHRs)
and personal fitness monitoring [28, 5, 6]. A person may
have specified a background access control policy, defin-
ing who (what role) can access their medical data. A
change in context arises when someone has a medical
emergency while exercising outside the home, or due to
a traffic accident. Ideally, their policy should indicate
what access can be made to their data, even when they
are unconscious in an emergency situation. If this is not
the case, an emergency override may be made, some-
times known as a “break-glass policy”. Here, audit is
seen as essential, as a safeguard that the decisions taken
were in the best interests of the patient (data subject).
A similar example from the IoT is that an internet-
connected fitness monitor may indicate that its owner
is suffering a medical emergency, causing an application
context change for use of the data it is gathering, from
lifestyle to medical.
One of the ways that data protection laws deal with
the complexity of IoT services is to impose stringent
responsibilities on those who determine the purpose
and manner of data collection and use (known as data
controllers), as well as those who hold, manage, and
operate on personal data on their behalf (data proces-
sors). This ensures the reach-through of responsibility
for proper data handling, but it can be onerous when a
data controller has little control or view of the data pro-
cessor’s internal workings [21]. In § 4 we argue that the
scope of responsibility of data controllers and proces-
sors might best be defined by structuring the IoT, where
appropriate, as a federation of administrative domains.
We explore the contribution that audit tools can
make in addressing both points above: 1) that changes
in the context of personal data flows demand user in-
volvement; 2) that although involving users is difficult,
this does not diminish the responsibility to provide ef-
fective notice and control.
Audit tools may also contribute to meeting a range
of data protection law obligations, in particular:
– Transparency: informing users about the identity
of the data controller, the purposes of the process-
ing, the recipients of the data (including use for di-
rect marketing purposes and possible sharing with
specified categories of third parties), use of sensitive
data, and the existence of users’ rights of access, op-
position and discontinuation of service. Audit tools
can indicate to users to where their data has flowed,
how it has been used and processed, and who has
accessed it.
– Security: implementing and sufficiently guarantee-
ing appropriate technical and organisational mea-
sures to protect personal data, as well as performing
security assessments of systems as a whole, applying
principles of composable security. Note that these
obligations tend not to prescribe the use of any par-
ticular (technical) security techniques. Audit tools
can assist in demonstrating that security measures
have been taken appropriately.
– Enabling users’ rights: facilitating the user’s rights
of access to raw data and intelligible information
about how their data is processed and any decisions
made from it; rights to opposition; rights to mod-
ification and deletion of personal data, at a fine-
grained level for each type of data collected by a spe-
cific thing, the same type of data collected by differ-
ent things, or a particular operation on all personal
data; and rights to discontinue a given service. Note
that audit of data flows is necessary to ascertain
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whether these rights have been adhered to through
policy expression and enforcement, thus helping to
demonstrate compliance.
Examples: Data flows within and between appli-
cation contexts
If application contexts were to be opened up, a per-
son’s movements from home, when travelling by car
or public transport, at work, at lunch, in the park, at
the cinema etc. could potentially be publicly available.
This would likely be an invasion of privacy and require
regulation. Similar issues already arise regarding mo-
bile phone tracking, when a person’s location might be
available to limited numbers of people, such as a con-
trolling family member as well as the phone company.
Within some application contexts, such as the home
and workplace, identities may acceptably be recorded
for internal use. Within a cinema or restaurant, public
identification of staff and customers will generally be
unacceptable. Controlled identification of, say, staff to
management but not of customers may be needed. In a
smart city with traffic control, it may be that only the
police and not the general public may know the iden-
tities of drivers, but even this is fraught with dificulty
in the context of racial profiling in America. More gen-
erally, the presented examples are illustrative and the
regulation concerns are far more nuanced.
Regarding regulation of the opening up of applica-
tion contexts, we need to consider what data is legit-
imately needed to flow from them. When a train ar-
rives at a station, coarse grained information such as
the number of people exiting the station is useful for
scheduling taxis and buses, while information identi-
fying individuals is superfluous and can be considered
excessively invasive. On the other hand, in the case of
an emergency in a public building such as a fire alarm
or bomb scare, it is desirable to be able to identify in-
dividuals.
An audit mechanism must be able to identify 1) the
state of data items, including data resulting from trans-
formations (e.g., an aggregate vs. identifying informa-
tion); 2) the service accessing the information; and 3)
the context in which the data is being accessed. Such
information can be derived from the analysis of data-
provenance graphs, as discussed in § 6.
4 The challenges of system-wide policy
Existing technical mechanisms, such as access control,
have been proposed to control the use and flow of data
beyond an individual’s direct control [70] or to maintain
Audit Plane
Enforcement Plane
Regulation Plane
Fig. 2 Data flow planes.
certain bounds around data, through managing storage
and computation specifics [61, 15].
Proposed mechanisms for technically enforcing secu-
rity policy in the IoT include authentication, remote at-
testation, access control and encryption; see [58]. Such
mechanisms may be used to comply with specific legal
requirements, and some specific technical approaches
can be required by law, for instance, that medical data
must be stored in an unintelligible (encrypted) form.
Generally, there are a number of issues concerning
mechanisms for policy enforcement for IoT [59]:
– A uniform enforcement mechanism is unlikely to be
possible across solutions or administrative domains,
even in situations where service providers and de-
vice manufacturers make best efforts. For example,
a front-end service may offer individual users modi-
fiable privacy settings, while the underlying storage
service may only be able to provide access guaran-
tees per application, and not for individual users of
the application.
– The context in which a device is used may define
the regulatory constraints to which it is subject.
The ad hoc and user-driven nature of the IoT vi-
sion may allow a device originally designed for a
particular purpose (e.g. lifestyle monitoring) to be
used in another domain (e.g. medical), subject to a
different set of concepts, constraints and regulatory
frameworks. Even similar products may express and
enforce privacy settings in different ways (a famil-
iar example is the inconsistency of privacy settings
across different social media).
– There is generally very little means to control, mon-
itor or audit the use of data after it has been allowed
to leave some application context. This is especially
true for end users who may not fully understand
or be aware of the complex chain of providers in-
volved in the delivery of a service. However, the law
has the concept of “reach-through” and the require-
ment that it is enforced. Audit is a first step towards
complying with this requirement.
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Such issues may naturally lead to discrepancies between
regulatory requirements, including user preferences, and
the tools deployed technically to enforce those require-
ments and preferences, as illustrated in the planes of
Fig. 2. In deployment, mismatches between the regu-
lation, enforcement and audit planes in Fig. 2 are in-
evitable. This is because the enforcement mechanisms
may not perfectly align with the regulation plane, due
to the restricted scope of technological solutions, dif-
ferences in interpretation of the law, system-specific re-
quirements and constraints, end-user or economic pres-
sures etc.
Therefore, service providers may decide to limit in-
teractions and exchange of data outside a number of
well-defined services, in order to meet their security
obligations (see § 3) among other considerations (see
§ 2). This can be regarded as creating application or
administrative domains, preventing data from flowing
more widely without negotiation. We argued in § 2 that
the silos that lock users in to specific technologies are
undesirable for meeting the wider IoT vision. Given in-
teroperability standards, structuring the IoT as feder-
ated administrative domains is a likely natural conse-
quence to facilitate management. In § 5 we see that
representing such a structure in an audit graph is a
means for managing the scale of audit in the IoT.
Further, as discussed in § 3, even a perfect enforce-
ment mechanism that fully implements defined policy
on allowed data flows, would not of itself meet the
emerging requirements for transparency and account-
ability. To achieve these, an audit mechanism is also
required to provide supporting evidence: 1) as a basis
for the mandated transparency for end users to exer-
cise their rights, 2) to allow trust establishment across
administrative domains through mutual auditing, 3)
to allow the alignment over time of technical enforce-
ment mechanisms with regulation and end users’ re-
quirements.
Traditional application-centric auditing would suf-
fer similar issues to those discussed above for the en-
forcement mechanism: focusing only on the aspect im-
portant for a particular application and hindering un-
derstanding of system-wide behaviour. These issues make
meaningful exploitation of such audit data difficult system-
wide. It appears that in order to align with the information-
centric nature of the regulation and end-user privacy
requirements, an information-centric audit mechanism
needs to be exploited. This is the third (audit) plane
in Fig. 2, representing information exchange resulting
from actual executions. In § 5 we discuss technical means
and challenges in order to capture audit data system-
wide, and in § 6 we discuss technical means and chal-
lenges when interpreting the audit data.
Aline
Output fileProcess
Input File
Executable
wasAssociatedWith
used
used
wasGeneratedBy
Fig. 3 A simple W3C ProvDM compliant provenance graph.
5 Capture and exploitation of provenance data
Previous sections described how some aspects of data
protection law can be expressed as constraints on in-
formation flow. This section discusses data provenance
as a mechanism to enable transparency over informa-
tion flow, while § 6 explores provenance as a means to
enable the audit of those information flows.
Provenance [14] is a record of the origin of and trans-
formations applied to data within a system. Provenance
aims to answer the following questions: Where do data
come from? Who manipulated the data? What trans-
formations were applied? Provenance data can be rep-
resented as a directed acyclic graph describing the re-
lationships among elements composing a system (data
items, processing steps, users, contextual information
etc.). These elements fall into three categories: entities
(i.e. data items), activities (i.e. transformations applied
to data) and agents (i.e. persons in the legal sense).
Fig. 3 shows a simple provenance graph following
the W3C-specified standard [43].2 This provenance graph
represents a process that used an executable and an
input file to generate an output file. This process was
associated with the user Aline. A provenance graph cap-
tured at the OS level by systems such as LPM [10] or
CamFlow [51, 49] can contain millions of nodes.
Provenance can be divided into the two broad cat-
egories of observed and disclosed provenance [11].
– Observed provenance is captured at the system level,
and recently led to ‘whole-system provenance’ [53,
10, 51] that captures all interactions between pro-
cesses and the operating systems, aiming for com-
pleteness. In a Linux context, completeness can be
ensured through guarantees provided by Linux Se-
curity Modules [20, 32, 23]. We rely on such prop-
erties in our own implementation (CamFlow) [51].
CamFlow can be used in systems running some Linux
distributions (from servers, to low-end devices) or
to smartphones/tablets running the Android OS.
In closed systems (e.g. Windows or MacOS) weaker
2 https://www.w3.org/TR/prov-overview/, as stated in § 2
building on standards is of fundamental importance for the
interoperability of IoT systems.
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coverage has been achieved (i.e. fewer information
flow sources may be recorded) in projects such as
Spade [24].
– Disclosed provenance is provided by applications (as
opposed to being generated by the underlying sys-
tems) in order to describe inner data dependencies.
Disclosed provenance has for example, been pro-
posed for Hadoop MapReduce [2, 18] and Spark [31].
Completeness or correctness of disclosed provenance
is harder to guarantee [40]. However, when com-
pared with observed provenance it is possible to de-
scribe semantic information more finely.
Whole-system provenance solutions tend to provide a
means to integrate disclosed provenance with system-
observed provenance to refine the end results [10, 51].
The Core Provenance Library [40] aimed at integration
of provenance from different layers and sources, allow-
ing provenance objects to be referenced and queried in
a uniform manner.
Our proposal is based on the following idea: regula-
tion and end users’ requirements represent expected sys-
tem behaviour ; technical enforcement mechanisms rep-
resent permissible actions; while provenance data repre-
sents actual system behaviour [52, 8]. Through analysing
the provenance we can determine if the intent of the
regulation is being captured by the enforcement mech-
anism. Discrepancies between the observed behaviour
and expected behaviour can be reported, and the en-
forcement mechanism corrected accordingly. In the rest
of this section we discuss the challenges posed by wide
scale provenance capture.
Confidentiality: controlling access to provenance
data
Provenance records in themselves may constitute sen-
sitive information. Indeed, records such as a history of
system execution contain information about a user’s ac-
tivities, and how she interacted with other users. One
can learn from ISP records which websites Aminata vis-
ited, but not the content of the exchanges. Similarly,
provenance records can show that there were interac-
tions between Aminata’s and Bernardo’s smart watches,
even if the content of the messages exchanged is un-
known. Access to provenance information must there-
fore be controlled.
In the literature, this is known as Provenance Ac-
cess Control [47, 13] (PAC), not to be confused with
Provenance-based Access Control [48, 9] (PBAC).3 PAC
3 PBAC uses provenance information to make primary data
access decisions, while PAC controls access to the provenance
data itself.
must 1) be fine grained; 2) consider privacy constraints;
3) ensure that useful information can be obtained, even
when full access cannot be granted. Concerning the last
point, a provenance graph with a “hole” (omission),
due to access control, might appear to defeat the use
of provenance as an audit tool. A solution often pro-
posed in the literature is the abstraction of a prove-
nance graph [44, 30] that both hides sensitive informa-
tion and conserves the semantic information necessary
for provenance analyses.
A more general problem in the IoT is to devise a de-
centralised access control model [28] that can be adapted
to the specifics of provenance data. To the authors knowl-
edge, this is a challenge that remains to be addressed
for the IoT. Our work on access control for widely dis-
tributed systems [5] suggests a structure of federated
administrative domains with negotiated inter-domain
access.
Integrity: trusting the provenance data
If data provenance is to be used as a primary source of
information for audit of the complex behaviour of IoT
systems, it is necessary to establish trust in the data.
The work of Bates et al. [10] represents the state of
the art in the domain. They combine remote attesta-
tion [17] based on hardware roots of trust through the
Linux Integrity Measurement Architecture [56, 33]; and
cryptographic techniques to guarantee non-repudiation
of provenance data. Remote attestation is necessary to
establish the trustworthiness of the provenance data.
Non-repudiation is important since provenance “records
history, and history does not change” [12]; that is, prove-
nance should include some immutability guarantees. A
standard technique would be to use hashing and sign-
ing, based on a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).
Availability and Scalability
Availability is a challenge to be addressed when cap-
turing provenance at the IoT scale; i.e., one must be
able to access the information necessary to perform an
audit at any given time. Availability issues have gener-
ally not been considered when building provenance sys-
tems [57]. However, the push towards high-performance
provenance, with projects building on top of Apache
Accumulo [45],4 may represent a first step in this di-
rection. Indeed, cloud-based storage systems such as
Accumulo are designed with availability as one of their
4 A scalable open-source key/value store implementation
based on the design of Google’s BigTable.
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core requirements. Guaranteeing both availability and
secured access to provenance across application admin-
istrative domains remains an open challenge.
Provenance systems (as well as audit/logging sys-
tems in general [22, 35]) generate a very large amount
of audit data [14]. Mechanisms must exist to handle the
high volume of data generated, so that such systems
can sustain a constant ingest of large amounts of data,
and not collapse under the workload.
One approach is to use stream processing of the
provenance data (e.g. [16]). That is, queries could be
applied to provenance data as they are generated. Our
own provenance capture in CamFlow allows for the col-
lection of provenance across a distributed system via
the publication of provenance data over messaging mid-
dleware such as Apache ActiveMQ,5 MQTT6 or Apache
Flume.7 Selecting the appropriate messaging middle-
ware is dependent on where in the IoT spectrum the ap-
plication lies (see Fig. 1). In complex multi-application
scenarios it is likely that multiple protocols will need
to be supported. Hardware constraints on devices in-
teracting with the physical world, and network acces-
sibility, such as devices’ interactions with firewalls and
NAT, also need careful consideration when selecting a
protocol.
Such a provenance stream can be exploited at scale
using tools such as Apache Spark [4] at runtime. For
example, an auditor may want to specify a number of
queries relating to some regulations (we further discuss
the exploitation of provenance data in an audit context
in § 6). Stream processing of the provenance data can
lead to the generation of an event that triggers an ac-
tion (e.g. to alert a customer that a new service has
been given access to its data). In such cases, it may not
be necessary to retain the entirety of the provenance
graph, but only a smaller subset relating to an event.
Provenance can also be stored and exploited at rest.
The ingest of a large amount of provenance data is the
subject of active research [45]. Provenance being a di-
rected graph, advances in graph processing techniques
e.g. [38, 25, 55, 26, 69] can be leveraged for its analysis.
Means to reduce the amount of collected data have
been explored. Bates et al. [8] introduced the “take only
what you need” approach to provenance where MAC
policies are used to determine sensitive objects. Our
own work built on Information Flow Control policy [51]
to achieve a similar objective. Security policies are used
as a filtering mechanism on the audit data. The justifi-
cation for this is that certain (unlabelled) data are not
5 http://activemq.apache.org/
6 ISO/IEC 20922:2016 http://www.iso.org/iso/catalogu
e_detail.htm?csnumber=69466
7 https://flume.apache.org/
considered sensitive and need not be the subject of au-
dit. In later work [51, 49] we expanded this concept to
multiple dimensions beyond security policies, collecting
provenance based on, for example, network interfaces
or control groups. The trade-offs of such an approach
need to be considered with care. While significantly re-
ducing the amount of data provenance generated, im-
portant information may not be recorded. The purpose
of the provenance capture needs to be understood and
clearly defined, the potential adversary identified, and
thus the minimum and sufficient information required
to demonstrate compliance. It remains to be explored
in such a complex ecosystem as IoT, if data items of in-
terest can reliably be identified. For example, inferences
over diverse types of public data may reveal sensitive
information about people, which argues for all flows,
labelled and unlabelled, being audited.
Another approach to deal with the large amount of
data is compression. The W3C-PROV standard is W3C
RDF-compliant, greatly helping with the processing of
the generated graph [7, 46]. Graphs, especially RDF
graphs, can be compressed through automatic pattern
recognition. Repeating patterns in a graph are identi-
fied at write time. Instead of storing multiple repre-
sentations of each node and edge composing the pat-
tern, the identifier corresponding to the pattern and
a list of parameters are stored. Applying the parame-
ters to the pattern allows the subgraph to be recovered
at read-time. Techniques specifically tailored to prove-
nance graphs have been explored, leading to a signifi-
cantly smaller and queryable storage format [68, 67].
Distributed Management
For the entire IoT, whole-system provenance is infeasi-
ble and structuring of captured provenance data in line
with the various management structures and applica-
tion contexts within IoT is natural and desirable. The
model of application contexts creates a useful partition-
ing of audit data. Audit data from within the context
can be held and investigated separately from external
flows between contexts. The global audit graph can rep-
resent an application context, such as a workplace, as
a single node, capable of expansion if needed. Such a
partitioning can also be the basis of access control to
the audit data.
In previous work on role-based access control (RBAC),
within a structure of federated administrative domains [5],
we proposed that inter-domain access should be negoti-
ated in terms of roles defined within the interoperating
domains. For example, a doctor at a hospital may be
allocated the privileges associated with a role “research-
scientist” at a Research Institute for her specialism. For
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the IoT, given standards for interoperability, we believe
that such a structure has potential as a basis for man-
aging audit.
While data provenance has been the subject of ex-
tensive research, these results have yet to be combined
in a system able to handle provenance at the IoT scale.
These issues represent important and interesting re-
search challenges yet to be fully addressed.
6 Verifying Compliance with Policy
Retrospective security [39, 54, 65, 3] is the detection of
security violations after execution. That is, suspicious
transactions are not actively prevented. Retrospective
security can be motivated by the difficulty of enforcing
policy consistently across a complex system as discussed
in § 4 and involvement of elements outside the system
(third parties or human). Retrospective security can be
built on audit-data capture such as described in § 5.
Retrospective verification of compliance (account-
ability) is particularly appropriate when: (1) detection
of a violation occurs outside the computer system, such
as when a user unexpectedly sees their personal data
become publicly available; (2) when the violation oc-
curs outside the systems that the subject directly con-
trols; (3) when operators are highly trusted. Hospitals
are a prime example of (3), where employees are highly
accountable [66]. In an IoT scenario, an example of (1)
and (2) could be devices disclosing information auto-
matically in case of a detected/suspected emergency [6];
emergency disclosure should invariably be accompanied
by a detailed audit record. In the case where someone is
claiming compensation on the grounds that their data
has been leaked by a system, audit can be used as a ba-
sis for evidence on whether a leak did or did not occur.
There are a few examples of analysis of provenance
graphs to demonstrate conformance with certain regu-
lations. Sakka et al. [57] discuss provenance in a cloud
context in relation to document lifecycles. The appli-
cation is banking under French regulation,8 to ensure
the probative value in court of electronic documents.
This requires the emitter of any document to be iden-
tified and guarantees its integrity, which is achieved
through provenance. Curbera et al. [19] proposed to use
provenance to demonstrate compliance of businesses
with regulation such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act or the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA).
8 Code Civil Article 1316-1.
Identifying compliance violation
In [34], program dependence graphs (that can be con-
sidered a subset of provenance graphs) are analysed to
demonstrate compliance with a given policy. For exam-
ple, in a game where a user enters a number and the
AI tries to guess this number, it can be demonstrated
that the AI does not cheat if there is no dependency
between the AI output and the user input. Similarly,
the graph can be analysed to ensure that there is no
dependency between a public output and a user pass-
word. Conversely, analyses of such graphs can reveal
which information could be disclosed by a program [63],
information that may in turn be disclosed to end-users.
Similar analyses can be performed to demonstrate com-
pliance with regulations, assuming such regulations can
be expressed as constraints on information flow. In pre-
vious work [50], we used provenance to demonstrate
compliance with the French data privacy agency guide-
lines in a cloud-connected smart home system.
In § 3 we discussed the importance of the context
in which an information transfer occurs. Verifying, for
example, that information is disclosed only when a user
is at a specific location, means verifying that there ex-
ists a dependency between the disclosure event and an
item of data representing the location of the user (and
obviously verifying that the location is correct). An ab-
sence of such a dependency means either: 1) the loca-
tion is not being verified by the application; or 2) the
location is inferred by other means (e.g. an action of
a human operator on site, or point-to-point interaction
with a fixed device). While a provenance graph is ideal
for obtaining a comprehensive view of the context of an
operation, extracting this context may require complex
analysis and domain specific knowledge.
Legibility of the audit record
It is clear that regulators are aware of, but not yet re-
solved as to the solution to, legibility concerns in en-
suring effective notice and control to users. So for ex-
ample, the WP29 report on IoT elaborates its guid-
ance to provide clear, comprehensible and user-friendly
notices by suggesting a QR code or flashcode on ob-
jects themselves and, at the very least, require some-
thing more than general privacy policy on the data
controllers’ websites. It also emphasises that informa-
tion should be offered to non-users whose personal data
may be accessed within the IoT, as well as users. In
separate WP29 reports, namely, the 2012 Opinion on
Cloud Computing, and 2013 Opinion on Apps in Smart
Systems, WP29 suggests what we are proposing in this
paper: namely, clear audit trails so that end users can
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clearly see where their data is accessed and in what
quantities. Audit is complemented in the WP29 reports
by other tools that we should consider for future work,
such as finding ways to allow easy modification of pref-
erences without reducing control or inducing informa-
tion fatigue. Another WP29 suggestion is for layered
information notices, combined with meaningful icons
to indicate certain data flows and uses.
Similarly, the FTC report on IoT discusses options
for clear, prominent and conspicuous notice and choice,
including developing video tutorials, affixing QR codes
on devices, icons, oﬄine communications, and providing
choices at the point of sale, within set-up wizards, or in
a privacy dashboard, command centre or management
portal. Again, it emphasises not burying terms within
lengthy documents. It also suggests the possibility of
legislative or multi-stakeholder frameworks that could
further refine permitted or prohibited uses. In earlier
reports in March 2012 on Consumer Privacy9 and in
February 2013 on Mobile Privacy and Transparency,10
emphasis was given to standard notices, icons and other
disclosures, with an extensive discussion, particularly
in the latter, of different design concepts. Nevertheless,
none of these reports tied legibility specifically to audit
and data flows.
Structuring the audit graph
The partitioning of the notional global audit graph for
IoT into intra and inter application context flows helps
make the management of audit data more tractable,
and more secure. Audit can focus on flows from a given
context to ascertain that data has been suitably trans-
formed or aggregated. Any policy violations can be in-
vestigated.
7 Conclusion
Data protection requirements will apply to significant
volumes of data generated within the IoT. We have ex-
plored aspects of the legal and regulatory obligations
that apply to the developers and deployers of IoT sys-
tems. Transparency and accountability lie at the heart
of these obligations. Both require evidence (audit) of
9 https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/document
s/reports/federal-trade-commission-report-protectin
g-consumer-privacy-era-rapid-change-recommendations
/120326privacyreport.pdf
10 https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/document
s/reports/mobile-privacy-disclosures-building-trust
-through-transparency-\federal-trade-commission-sta
ff-report/130201mobileprivacyreport.pdf
where data has flowed as an essential first step. Cur-
rently, such a capability is not provided or even consid-
ered at a technical level. As the IoT is consumer-led and
its adoption requires trust by people and organisations,
it is clear that means for improving transparency and
accountability are very much needed.
This requires a great deal of work across diverse ar-
eas. Our focus is on how evidence of data flows can be
gathered and queried. Other aspects are on how policy
can be authored to align with law and regulation; how
users can be assisted in expressing their wishes, as man-
dated by law; how all parties can be given transparency
on what has happened to their data; how diferent sizes
of organisation, e.g., SMEs, can be best supported to
develop appropriate policy; and how the audit can be
investigated to demonstrate compliance with law, thus
achieving accountability.
We have previously argued that the ideal scenario
for the future IoT is where law and regulation can be re-
flected in technically-enforceable policy. Ideally, law and
regulation should be drafted with technical enforcement
in mind. Technologists can but start from the assump-
tion that this is possible, but it is a research issue in
itself. This paper describes how compliance with such
policy can be demonstrated by recording data prove-
nance and auditing the flows of data throughout the
IoT. That is, our focus here is not on the technology for
policy enforcement, but on how the audit of data flows
could assist in demonstrating compliance with (tech-
nical) policy, and by extension, with regulation. As a
side-effect, the audit process would contribute to iden-
tifying discrepancies between law and expressed policy
and contribute to the honing of the process.
Our goal is to make a strong case for audit in the
IoT, without which there is little hope of transparency
or accountability. With audit in place, evidence-based
experience can be accumulated on what aspects of com-
pliance can and cannot be demonstrated.
There are many challenges involved in providing
such transparency and accountability for a system of
the scale of the IoT. We have previously worked within
a system structure of federated administrative domains,
as a means of managing access control within and be-
tween domains. We see such a structure as helpful for
managing the IoT, given interoperability standards. The
ability to structure an audit graph and the ability to
“zoom in” on certain contexts and subsystems, which
are represented by a single node at a higher level, seems
to us to be appropriate for the IoT. We outlined our
own work in this area as a contribution towards improv-
ing transparency and accountability in the IoT through
data provenance and audit.
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